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Introduction
Comparative advertising, "the advertising that compares alternative brands on objectively measurable attributes or price, and identi…es the alternative brand by name, illustration or other distinctive information", 1 is a widespread marketing practise met across various industries. 2 According to empirical observations in the U.S. market comparative advertising rates among 40% to 60% of total advertising (see e.g., Muehling et al., 1990; Pechmann and Stewart, 1990 ). 3 Recent empirical evidence suggests that …rms use both non-comparative and comparative advertising to approach consumers (see e.g., Anderson et al., 2013 Anderson et al., , 2015 Liaukonyte, 2012) . For instance, Liaukonyte (2012) shows that in the U.S. over-the-counter analgetics market, Aleve devoted up to 90% of its total advertising in comparative ads and the rest in non-comparative ads, while the proportions for its competitors, Advil and Tylenol, were 70% and 26%, respectively. Consequently, one important question that a …rm faces when it designs its advertising strategy is whether it should launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns and if so, what should be the optimal advertising mix.
The above questions have not been thoroughly addressed by the existing literature which even though it has studied comparative advertising it has done so by focusing on its informative attributes and its signalling role (Anderson and Renault, 2009; Barigozzi et al., 2009; Emons and Fluet, 2012) . This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the …rms' advertising strategies in an imperfectly competitive market in which …rms can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. In particular, we address the following questions: Do …rms have incentives to spend on both non-comparative and comparative advertising and if so, which is the optimal advertising mix? How does the intensity of market competition a¤ect the …rms'expenditures on each type of advertising and their opti- 1 Statement of policy regarding comparative advertising, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., August13, 1979. 2 Typical examples of comparative advertising are, among others, the advertising campaigns of Subway that point out the higher nutritional value of its products in comparison to the Mc Donald's ones, the "Get a Mac" commercials of Apple that promote the capabilities, the security and the attributes of a Mac in comparison to a PC, and the advertising battles of Pepsi and Coca Cola. 3 Muehling et al. (1990) suggest that in the U.S. market almost 40% of all advertisements are comparative in content. Pechmann and Stewart (1990) show that in the U.S. market 60% of all the advertising campaigns contains indirect comparative claims, 20% contains direct comparative claims, and only the remaining 20%
contains no comparative claims.
1 mal advertising mix? How does the presence of both types of advertising in a market a¤ect market outcomes and welfare in comparison to markets in which either one or both types of advertising are absent?
We consider a horizontally di¤erentiated duopolistic market in which …rms can use noncomparative and comparative advertising to a¤ect the consumers' perception of the products'qualities. Non-comparative advertising promotes the quality of each own …rm's product.
Therefore, by increasing the consumers'perceived quality of the advertised product, it shifts the …rm's demand outwards. Comparative advertising instead has a push-me-pull-you dual e¤ect (Anderson et al, 2015) : Not only it promotes the quality of the sponsoring …rm's product, but also, by presenting it as superior to that of the rival's, it decreases the consumers' perceived quality of the targeted product. Comparative advertising thus increases the …rm's own demand and decreases the demand of the rival. A two stage game is analyzed in which …rms decide …rst over the type(s) and the intensity of their advertising campaigns and then they compete in quantities or prices in the market.
We show that in equilibrium …rms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. 4 Our analysis reveals that within each …rm non-comparative and comparative advertising are strategic complements. Therefore, a …rm optimally spends on both types of advertising, because by spending on non-comparative advertising it increases the marginal pro…tability of its comparative advertising expenditures (and vise versa). Further, we show that …rms always spend more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising. This is due to the nature of comparative advertising. Evidently, comparative advertising is more appealing than non-comparative advertising due to its' push-me-pull-you dual e¤ect. More importantly, as the competitive pressure increases in the market, …rms spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising. This …nding indicates that in a more competitive market, …rms adopt more aggressive advertising strategies, since there is more pressure for each …rm to improve its own position and harm its rival's. Further, this is in line with the empirical evidence that comparative advertising is often met in highly competitive markets characterized by close substitutable goods, such as the soft drinks industry and the over the counter analgetics market in U.S.
Interestingly, equilibrium non-comparative and comparative advertising intensities are Ushaped in the degree of products' substitutability. In addition, the comparative advertising intensity starts increasing for lower values of the degree of product substitutability than the non-comparative one. Intuitively, two opposing e¤ects are in action: The demand e¤ ect and the strategic e¤ ect. The …rst e¤ect lies on the fact that as the products becomes closer substitutes, each …rm's demand decreases and thus its incentives to spend on advertising become weaker.
The second e¤ect, the strategic e¤ect, captures the fact that closer products'substitutability translates into …ercer market competition, that reinforces the …rm's incentives to spend on advertising so as to retain its market share. Clearly, when the products are poor substitutes, an increase in the degree of product substitutability decreases the advertising intensities, since the strategic e¤ect is relatively weak and it is dominated by the demand e¤ect. Exactly the opposite holds when the products are closer substitutes. Further, the comparative advertising intensity starts increasing in lower values of product substitutability, because, as already mentioned above, …rms spend relatively more on comparative relative to non-comparative advertising as the competitive pressure in the market increases.
From a welfare perspective, our analysis indicates that the presence of both non-comparative and comparative advertising in a market can be welfare-enhancing in comparison to a market in which one or both types of advertising are absent. In fact, we show that consumers are always better-o¤ when …rms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. Although in the latter case …rms' pro…ts are lower than in a market in which either comparative or both types of advertising are banned, 5 the higher consumers' surplus quite often o¤sets the lower pro…ts, leading thus to higher welfare. In particular, a market with no restrictions in advertising typically leads to higher welfare than a market in which advertising is altogether banned (except if products are close substitutes and consumers' "quality consciousness" is rather low). 6 It also leads to higher welfare than a market in which comparative advertising is banned whenever consumers are su¢ ciently quality conscious and products are di¤erentiated enough. Therefore, from a policy perspective our …ndings suggest that authorities should carefully consider the speci…c features of a market before deciding whether to ban 5 Clearly, a ban on comparative advertising campaign is bene…cial for …rms, because in a symmetric equilibrium each …rm's comparative advertising campaign is nulli…ed by its rival's one. Therefore, …rms'comparative advertising campaigns constitute a clear loss, as …rms bear the cost of advertising without enjoying any bene…t (i.e., comparative advertising expenses are wasteful). 6 Emons and Fluet (2012), introduced the term quality consciousness.
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or not the use of comparative advertising. 7 Our main results do not depend on whether …rms compete in quantities or prices in the market. It is worth noting that as the competitive pressure increases, as measured now by the mode of competition, …rms switch to more aggressive advertising strategies, i.e., they spend relatively more on comparative than non-comparative advertising campaigns. Therefore, in a more competitive market environment, measured either by the degree of product substitutability or the mode of the market competition, the …rms'optimal advertising mix goes in favor of comparative advertising. Nevertheless, the equilibrium advertising intensities are lower under price than under quantity competition, since the marginal pro…tability of advertising is lower under the …ercer price competition. 
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Anderson and Renault (2009) consider comparative advertising as information disclosure for the horizontal match characteristics of the products. They show that if products are of similar quality, comparative advertising plays no role, since …rms provide full information for their products. If, instead, products are of su¢ ciently di¤erent quality, the low quality …rm engages in comparative advertising and discloses the horizontal characteristics of both products to improve its consumers base and survive in the market. The main di¤erences to our setting is that we consider that advertising is costly and that it in ‡uences the consumers'perception of the quality of the products. 9 Lastly, Chakrabarti and Haller (2011) extends the literature on comparative advertising by considering the n-…rm oligopoly case in which …rms decide not only their investment levels in comparative advertising but also the target of their advertising.
They show that under perfect symmetry, investments in comparative advertising constitute a net loss for both the …rms' performance and the welfare. The existing literature has mainly dealt with the analysis of the …rms' decisions to use either non-comparative or comparative advertising in a market. Our paper extends this literature by considering, instead, a setting in which …rms can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. This allows us to provide a detailed analysis on how …rms mix over alternative advertising strategies and how the latter a¤ects market outcomes and social welfare.
In Section 2, we present our basic model. Section 3 includes the equilibrium analysis and a comparison of our main results to those of a non-advertising, a mere non-comparative advertising and a mere comparative advertising market. In Section 4, we discuss extensions of our main model. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a market that consists of two …rms, each producing one brand of a horizontally di¤erentiated good. Each …rm i; i = 1; 2; can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns to in ‡uence the consumers'perception of the products'qualities. A non- 9 Another strand of the literature considers the use of advertising to promote the horizontal characteristics of products. Sun (2011), Koessler and Renault (2012) , Jansseny and Teteryatnikova (2013) and Celik (2014) analyze the incentives of …rms to disclose their product characteristics focusing on horizontal di¤erentiation.
We rather focus on the use of both non-comparative and comparative advertising to in ‡uence the consumers'
perception of the quality of the products.
comparative advertisement sends a positive message to consumers that promotes the quality of …rm i's product. A comparative advertisement, in line with Anderson et al. (2015) , conveys a push-me-pull-you dual message to consumers presenting the sponsoring …rm i's product as of superior quality to that of the rival …rm j's product. It thus increases a consumer's perception of the sponsoring …rm's product quality and decreases her perception of the rival's product quality.
On the demand side, there is a unit mass of consumers. The utility of a consumer depends on her perception of the two products'qualities, ( i ; j ), and is given by,
where q i ; q j , and z are respectively the quantities of goods i, j and the "composite" good that the consumer buys. The parameter s > 0 measures the consumer's valuation per unit of (perceived) quality. The parameter 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of product substitutability, with ! 0 corresponding to the case of almost independent goods and = 1 to the case of perfect substitutes. 10 Alternatively, can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of market competition, i.e., the higher ; the …ercer the market competition.
A consumer's perception of the quality level of good i can take values i 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g; in other words, good i can be perceived as of very low, low, standard, high and very high quality, respectively. Prior to any …rm's advertising campaigns, all consumers are identical and perceive the two …rms'products as of standard quality, i.e., i = j = 0. 11 Each …rm can in ‡uence a consumer's perception by sending her a non-comparative ad (message m i ) and/or a comparative ad (message c i ). Clearly, a consumer that receives no message by either …rm continues to believe that both products are of standard quality.
Consider …rst that only …rm i sends ads. If a consumer receives only a message m i , she perceives …rm i's product as of high quality ( i = 1). If a consumer receives only a message c i , she perceives …rm i's product as of high quality and …rm j's product as of low quality ( i = 1 and j = 1). If she receives both messages m i and c i , she perceives …rm i's product as of very high quality and …rm j's product as of low quality ( i = 2 and j = 1). 12 Consider 1 0 In Section 5, we brie ‡y discuss the case of complement goods ( 1 < 0). 1 1 This could be so e.g., because she assigns equal probabilities to all possible quality levels for each good. 1 2 Note that our results remain qualitatively intact if we assume instead that a consumer that receives both mi and ci, perceives the product of …rm i as of high quality ( i = 1; instead of i = 2). However, this alternative assumption leads to unnecessary analytical complications. 6 next that both …rms send ads. If a consumer receives messages c i and c j , the comparative ad messages nullify each other, and thus i = j = 0: In fact, due to c i ; the consumer perceives …rm i's product as of high quality and …rm j's product as of low quality, which are however o¤set by the exact opposite message that c j conveys. This leaves the consumer perceiving both products to be of standard quality, i = j = 0. Further, if a consumer receives messages m i ; c i and c j , then, as the comparative ad messages nullify each other, the consumer ends up with i = 1 and j = 0: Finally, if she receives all four messages, m i ; c i ; m j and c j , then i = j = 1.
Each …rm i launches non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns with intensities i and i , 0 i ; i 1; respectively. The intensity of a campaign represents the probability with which each consumer receives a respective ad. For instance, the probability of a consumer not receiving any message from either …rm is:
To compute …rm i's inverse demand function, we distinguish sixteen groups of consumers based on the messages that each receives from the two advertising …rms. Then the expected inverse demand function of …rm i is the weighted (by their respective probabilities) sum of the inverse demand functions of the sixteen groups of consumers and is given by 13
Observe that …rm i's demand increases in the intensity with which it launches non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns, i and i , and decreases in the intensity with which its rival launches comparative advertising, j .
We assume that the …rms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production technologies, with their marginal production cost given by c, 0 c < a. Moreover, we assume that the total cost of advertising is given by b( 2 i + 2 i ). It is separable across advertising campaigns and quadratic in each type of campaign, i.e., there are diminishing returns of advertising expenditures. The parameter b denotes the e¤ectiveness of the advertising technology on shifting consumers' demand, with a higher b corresponding to a less e¤ective advertising technology. As standard in the literature, the convexity assumption re ‡ects that the cost of advertising is increasing in the number of targeted consumers (see, e.g., Butters, 1977 A crucial modeling assumption is the separability of advertising costs. This is well documented in a recent strand of the managerial literature stressing that, due to the vast advances in media technology, there is need for specialization in di¤erent advertising techniques applied by the respective agencies. According to Horsky (2006) , …rms would prefer to use di¤erent agencies to promote their products in di¤erent channels, based on their specialization. Arzaghi et al. (2008) mention that advertising agencies in the US have moved from "full service provider" of advertising campaigns to providers of specialized services. Therefore, agency compensation has moved from a proportional commission based on …nal number of targeted consumers to "fee for service" provided by each agency. The main reason is that the complexity and interaction among cotemporal media technologies have made it di¢ cult to measure the …nal number of targeted consumers (Nichols, 2013) . Therefore, in our case, given the di¤erent handling required for non-comparative and comparative ads, we treat the two types of advertising as separate projects with independent costs.
Firms play a two stage game with observable actions. In the …rst stage, …rms independently and simultaneously decide their comparative and non-comparative advertising intensities. In the second stage, …rms compete in the market by setting their quantities. 14 To simplify the exposition, we adopt the following normalizations: s n = In the sequel, we make the following assumption. 
(2+ )(1+2 ) : 15 Assumption 1 is su¢ cient for the second-order and stability conditions to hold under all cases. Moreover, it guarantees that the intensity of advertising does not exceed one, and that all types of consumers buy non-negative amounts of both goods under all circumstances.
Moreover, it requires that the advertising technology is not too e¤ective, i.e., marginal adver- 1 4 In Section 4 we extend our analysis by examining price instead of quantity market competition. 1 5 This is a su¢ cient condition in order to avoid corner solutions. In particular, b sn( ; bn) is the (real) solution of the equation 2s
If this condition fails to hold, then a consumer receiving both non-comparative and comparative ads from …rm i; and no ads from …rm j; will not buy a non-negative quantity of the …rm j's product.
8 tising costs are su¢ ciently steep, 16 and that advertising does not alter too much a consumer's valuation per unit of quality.
Equilibrium Analysis
In the last stage, each …rm i chooses its output to maximize pro…ts
From the …rst order conditions, the reaction function of …rm i is
Observe that an increase in …rm i's advertising expenditures shifts its reaction function outwards, and therefore, tends to increase …rm i's output and (gross) pro…ts. By contrast, an increase in …rm j's expenditures on comparative advertising shifts …rm i's reaction function inwards, tending to reduce its output and pro…ts.
Solving the system of (4), the equilibrium quantities and pro…ts are
In the …rst stage, each …rm i chooses its advertising intensities, i and i , to maximize pro…ts i (:), taking as given the rival's advertising intensities, j and j . The …rst order conditions give rise to the following reaction functions of non-comparative and comparative advertising (expressed in terms of s n and b n )
An immediate observation is that the …rms'advertising intensities are strategic substitutes,
i.e.,
and
This implies that an increase in …rm j's 1 6 As standard in the relevant literature, non-existence of an equilibrium may arise because a su¢ ciently low advertising cost leads …rms to savage advertising warfares that conclude to negative pro…ts. Thus, advertising restrictions are required in order all the participants to be active in the market (see, e.g., Peters, 1984; Bester and Petrakis, 1995) .
advertising expenditures (either non-comparative or comparative) reduces …rm i's marginal revenue from either type of advertising and thus weakens its incentives to spend on advertising. More importantly, we observe that within each …rm non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns are strategic complements, i.e.,
That is, an increase in …rm i's expenditures on non-comparative advertising raises the marginal pro…tability of its'comparative advertising campaign (and vice versa). Intuitively, both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns have a positive direct e¤ect on …rm i's demand. In particular, an increase in …rm i's non-comparative advertising intensity, by expanding …rm i's demand, raises the marginal pro…tability of its comparative advertising campaign and thus reinforces …rm i's incentives to spend on comparative advertising (and vice versa).
Solving the system of (7) and (8), the resulting equilibrium intensities in each type of advertising are
Further, the equilibrium advertising ratio of non-comparative to comparative advertising, namely the optimal advertising mix, is given by
The following Proposition summarizes our …ndings.
Proposition 1 i) In equilibrium …rms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns, i.e., M > 0 and M > 0.
ii) The optimal advertising mix M ( ) < 1 for all > 0; with
iii) The equilibrium intensities of non-comparative and comparative advertising are U shaped in , decreasing in b n ; and increasing in s n .
Proposition 1 indicates that …rms spend on both non-comparative and comparative advertising. Intuitively, …rms launch both types of advertising campaigns to exploit the di¤erent e¤ects that each type of advertising has on demand. That is, to increase their own demand by raising the consumers'quality perception of their products due to the self promoting attributes of both non-comparative and comparative advertising messages, and to decrease their rival's demand due to the denigrating e¤ect of comparative advertising. Note however that this is not the only reason for which …rms spend on both non-comparative and comparative ads. As the two types of advertising are strategic complements within each …rm, a …rm by spending on one type of advertising raises the marginal pro…tability of the other type, and thus it has incentives to launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 informs us that the optimal advertising mix always favors comparative instead of non-comparative advertising as long as the goods are horizontally differentiated. This is due to the dual push-me-pull-you e¤ect of comparative advertising. In fact, a …rm prefers to spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising, since the former not only increases its own demand, but it also decreases the demand of the rival. More importantly, the optimal advertising mix decreases with the intensity of the market competition, i.e., @M @ < 0. Intuitively, …ercer market competition (larger ) creates pressure to …rms to adopt more aggressive advertising strategies. Clearly, as the market becomes more competitive, a …rm spends relatively more on comparative advertising in order to reduce the demand of the rival (increasing at the same time its own demand).
Proposition 1 also indicates how …rms adjust their advertising intensities as the market competition becomes …ercer. In particular, both non-comparative and comparative advertising intensities are U-shaped with . 17 Note, however, that the comparative advertising intensity starts increasing with for much lower values of than the non-comparative advertising intensity. In more details, when the goods are poor substitutes, an increase in the competitive pressure (higher ) leads …rms to decrease their advertising intensities, whereas the opposite is true for goods that are closer substitutes. This is because there are two opposing e¤ects in action: the negative demand e¤ ect and the positive strategic e¤ ect. The demand e¤ect captures the fact that individual demands decrease with and as a consequence, …rms' incentives to spend on advertising become weaker. On the other hand, the strategic e¤ect captures the fact that market competition becomes …ercer as increases, reenforcing thus the …rms'incentives to spend on advertising in order to retain their market shares. Clearly, when the goods are poor substitutes, the strategic e¤ect is relatively weak and is dominated by the demand e¤ect.
As a consequence, …rms'intensities in both types of advertising decrease with : The opposite is true when the goods are close substitutes, in which case the strategic e¤ect dominates.
Moreover, since comparative ads become relatively more important as competition intensi…es 1 7 It can be checked that < 0), it is clear that the strategic e¤ect is stronger for comparative advertising and overturns the demand e¤ect for lower values of : Finally, the equilibrium intensities of both types of advertising decrease with b n and increase with s n . As expected, as the advertising technology becomes more e¤ective, …rms advertising intensities increase. The same is true when the consumers valuation per unit of quality is higher, which is translated to higher demands for the …rms'products.
Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) and (6), the equilibrium output and pro…ts are
Proposition 2 i) Equilibrium output is decreasing in and b n , whereas it is increasing in s n .
ii) Equilibrium pro…ts are decreasing in and s n , whereas they are increasing in b n .
Proposition 2 informs us that equilibrium output decreases as the products become closer substitutes and the advertising technology becomes less e¤ective, whereas it increases as the consumers' valuation per unit of quality increases. Intuitively, a less e¤ective advertising technology leads …rms to spend less on both types of advertising, shifting inwards their reaction functions, which results to lower equilibrium output. In addition, equilibrium output decreases with ; because the negative demand e¤ect o¤sets the positive strategic e¤ect. By contrast, when consumers care more about the products'quality, …rms'expenditures on both types of advertising increase, resulting in …ercer market competition and higher equilibrium outputs.
Proposition 2 also indicates that equilibrium pro…ts decrease as the products become closer substitutes and the consumers'valuation per unit of quality increases, whereas they increase as the advertising technology becomes less e¤ective. Clearly, as b n increases, the advertising and the output competition between …rms becomes softer (i.e., …rms spend less on both types of advertising and produce lower quantities) that results in higher …rms' pro…tability. The opposite is true when the consumers' valuation per unit of quality increases. In fact, the higher the s n , the more intense the advertising warfare between …rms (i.e., the higher are the …rms'advertising intensities), and thus the lower are the …rms'pro…ts.
The Role of Mixed Advertising Strategies
We turn now to examine how the presence of both non-comparative and comparative advertising in a market a¤ects market outcomes and social welfare. To do so, we consider three alternative market settings. First, a standard Cournot market without any advertising activities: non-advertising market setting. Second, a market in which only non-comparative advertising is present: mere non-comparative advertising market setting. This is a market in which …rms play the same game as in Section 2, with the only di¤erence that i = 0. 18 Third, a market in which only comparative advertising is present: mere comparative advertising market setting. This is a market in which …rms play a game as the one described in Section 2, with the only di¤erence that i = 0. 19 For notational reasons, we use superscripts N , I and C to denote the equilibrium values under the Cournot, the mere non-comparative and the mere comparative market settings, respectively. Comparing the equilibrium advertising intensities, output and pro…ts in a mix advertising market with the three alternative ones, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 i) The equilibrium advertising intensities satisfy: M = I and M > C .
ii) The equilibrium outputs satisfy:
iii) The equilibrium pro…ts satisfy:
According to Proposition 3(i), the equilibrium comparative advertising intensity in a mixed advertising market always exceeds that of a mere comparative advertising market. This is mainly a consequence of the fact that in a mixed advertising market comparative and noncomparative advertising campaigns are strategic complements within each …rm. As …rms spend positively on non-comparative advertising in a mixed advertising market ( M > 0), their marginal pro…tability from comparative ads is higher than in a mere comparative market. By contrast, the equilibrium non-comparative advertising intensity in a mixed advertising market is equal to that in a mere non-comparative market. Strategic complementarity between the two types of advertising within a …rm in a mixed advertising market points towards higher non-comparative intensity in the latter than in a mere non-comparative market. Yet, strategic substitutability between the two types of advertising across …rms in a mixed advertising 1 8 This market setting corresponds to the case in which comparative advertising is prohibited by the law. It also corresponds to the case where even if the country's legislation allows for comparative advertising, comparative Miniard, 1999). 1 9 Due to space limitations we provide the analysis of the three alternative market settings in Appendix A.3.
13 market works in the opposite direction. The two forces exactly o¤set each other and the noncomparative advertising intensities turn out to be equal in the mere non-comparative and the mixed advertising markets.
Proposition 3(ii) indicates that equilibrium output is the same in a mixed and in a mere non-comparative advertising market, and higher than that of a non-advertising and a mere comparative advertising market. This is because in equilibrium, the …rms'comparative advertising intensities are equal and thus neutralize each other. In addition, as we have seen above, the equilibrium non-comparative advertising intensities are positive and equal in the mixed and the mere non-comparative market ( M = I > 0); which shifts the …rms'demands outwards and results to higher equilibrium output than in the mere comparative and the non-advertising markets.
Proposition 3(iii) informs us that …rms obtain the highest pro…ts in a mere non-comparative advertising market and the lowest in a mere-comparative advertising market. Moreover, …rms'
pro…ts are higher in a non-advertising market than in a mixed advertising market. This result is driven by two e¤ects on a …rm's pro…ts. The positive e¤ect of advertising on a …rm's demand and gross pro…ts, and the negative e¤ect of the advertising costs. It is straightforward that a mere comparative advertising market yields the lowest …rms' pro…ts, since in a symmetric equilibrium any potential bene…t from a …rm's spending on comparative advertising is nulli…ed by its rival's one. Thus, …rms enjoy no bene…t and only bear the cost of advertising (i.e., comparative advertising expenses are wasteful). 20 It is also clear that a mere non-comparative advertising market yields the highest pro…ts for the …rms, as the shift in a …rm's demand due to the self-promoting advertising more than compensates the cost of advertising. This, in turn, implies that the …rms'pro…ts in a non-advertising market, in which they are unable to promote their products, are lower than in a mere non-comparative advertising market. Lastly, a mixed advertising market yields lower pro…ts for …rms than a non-advertising market. This is due to the fact that the increase in pro…ts from their non-comparative advertising campaigns does not compensate for the …rms'wasteful advertising expenditures in comparative advertising.
Turning our attention to the welfare implications and comparing consumers' surplus and total welfare in the aforementioned markets, we obtain the following result:
ii) SW M > SW C ; SW M > SW N except if is large enough and s n very small; SW M > SW I only if is small enough and s n is large enough.
According to Proposition 4, consumers are better-o¤ when both types of advertising are present in the market, whereas they are worse-o¤ in the absence of advertising. It is clear that in the presence of both non-comparative and comparative advertising in a market, a larger fraction of consumers is exposed to the …rms'advertising messages and thus their perception of the products'quality increases.
Moreover, total welfare in a mixed advertising market always exceeds that of a mere comparative advertising market. This is because both …rms' pro…ts and consumers' surplus are higher in the mixed than in the mere comparative advertising market. Interestingly, the welfare is (typically) higher in a mixed advertising market than in a non-advertising one. There is a small region of parameters, i.e., when products are close substitutes and consumers'valuation per unit of product's quality is too small, in which the opposite holds. Consumers'surplus is higher, whereas …rms'pro…ts are lower, in a mixed advertising than in a non-advertising market. Then the higher consumers'surplus dominates over the lower pro…ts, except if advertising hardly alters consumers'perception of quality and market competition is …erce.
More importantly, total welfare in a mixed advertising market exceeds that of a mere non-comparative market when the goods are rather poor substitutes and consumers are highly quality conscious (for high s n ). Here too, consumers'surplus is higher, whereas …rms'pro…ts are lower, in the mixed advertising than in the mere non-comparative advertising market. When consumers are su¢ ciently quality conscious (high s n ) and market competition is rather soft (low ), the higher consumers'surplus in the mixed advertising market dominates the higher industry pro…ts in the mere non-comparative advertising market. This is because when the competitive pressure is weak, the di¤erence in pro…ts across the two market settings is small.
In addition, as s n increases, …rms'advertising intensities increase in both market settings. As the fraction of consumers that are exposed to advertising messages in the mixed advertising compared to the non-comparative advertising market increases with s n , so does the di¤erence in consumers'surplus across the two market settings. Then for high enough s n and low enough ; the pro…t di¤erential is small and is dominated by the consumers' surplus di¤erential.
This is an interesting …nding that adds to the discussion of the welfare e¤ects of comparative advertising. More precisely, it demonstrates that, whereas comparative advertising campaigns can be detrimental to the …rms' pro…tability, they can improve total welfare as long as they are launched together with non-comparative advertising campaigns (provided that consumers'
are su¢ ciently quality conscious).
Extensions-Discussion
Next we extend our basic model to examine the robustness of our main results and explore the role of our assumptions. 21 
Bertrand Competition
In our basic model we have assumed that …rms compete in quantities.
We examine now what happens if …rms compete in prices. Under price competition each …rm i faces the following expected demand function,
To guarantee well-behaved interior solutions under all circumstances, we make the following assumption:
2 [0; 0:76] and s n s n ( ; b n ); with @sn @ < 0; @sn @bn > 0; s n (1; b n ) = 0 and lim bn!1 s n ( ; b n ) = 1 2+3 2 2 . 22 Note that stricter assumptions are required when …rms compete in prices instead of quantities. This is in line with Singh and Vives (1984) and is due to the fact that price competition is …ercer than quantity competition.
We con…rm that under price competition too, in equilibrium …rms launch both noncomparative and comparative advertising campaigns. The respective equilibrium advertising 2 1 The detailed analysis of the extensions presented below is available from the authors upon request. 2 2 Similarly to Cournot competition, sn( ; bn) solves: (2 2 )s 16 intensities and optimal advertising mix are
Interestingly, the optimal advertising mix is lower under price than under quantity competition, i.e., M B ( ) < M ( ) for > 0: That is, …rms' spending in comparative relatively to non-comparative advertising are higher when market competition takes places in prices instead of quantities. This …nding reveals that the more competitive the market environment, the more appealing the comparative advertising campaigns. Noting also that @M B @ < 0; we conclude that an increase in competitive pressure, measured either by the degree of product substitutability or the mode of the market competition, leads …rms to a more aggressive advertising warfare. In particular, …rms choose a more aggressive mix of advertising strategies, i.e., higher comparative relatively to the non-comparative advertising intensities. Note however that the advertising intensities are lower under price than under quantity competition. This is because the rentability of sending messages are lower under the …ercer price competition.
We con…rm that our main results hold also when …rms compete in prices. 23 The only exception is that the equilibrium intensity in non-comparative advertising is decreasing (instead of U-shaped) in : This is because market competition is now …ercer and …rms substitute away the less aggressive non-comparative advertising campaigns with the more aggressive comparative ones.
Complementary Goods
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that …rms produce substitute goods. We discuss now what would happen in case of complementary goods, i.e., 2 [ 1; 0) where = 1
captures perfect complementarity. Note that the analysis is the same as in Section 3, with now taking negative (instead of positive) values.
Surprisingly, in this case too …rms launch both comparative and non-comparative advertising campaigns. However, the optimal advertising mix in this case favors non-comparative advertising, i.e., M ( ) > 1 for 1 < 0 (see, 11). In particular, when goods are complements …rms spend less on comparative than in non-comparative advertising campaigns. This is because in the case of complementary goods, the push-me-pull-you e¤ect of comparative advertising has a di¤erent nature. In particular, the "pull you" e¤ect of comparative advertising has adverse implications for the advertising …rm. This is because a decrease in the consumers'perceived quality of the rival's product, and therefore a decrease in the rival's demand, decreases also the demand of the advertising …rm. This makes comparative advertising less attractive in case of complementary goods, and thus …rms spend relatively more on non-comparative advertising than under substitute goods.
In light of this, it is not surprising that, contrary to the case of substitute goods, when goods are complements …rms'pro…ts in a mix advertising market are typically higher than in a non-advertising market, i.e., M > N except if the goods are weak complements ( close to 0). This is because the optimal advertising mix favors non-comparative instead of comparative advertising, and therefore the positive e¤ect of advertising on …rm's demand and gross pro…ts more than compensates the negative e¤ect of the advertising costs. Accordingly, we …nd that SW M > SW N always holds in this case, as both the consumers'surplus and the …rms'pro…ts are higher in a mixed advertising than in a non-advertising market. The rest of our …ndings are qualitatively the same as in the case of substitute goods.
Advertising Cost Asymmetries
We performed our analysis so far under the assumption that the costs of the non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns are the same. However, in reality when a …rm invests in comparative advertising, it runs the risk of being prosecuted to the courts by the rivals and to be accused for misleading advertising. 24 Motivated by the latter, we examine what happens when the cost of comparative advertising exceeds that of non-comparative advertising. Assuming that the cost of comparative advertising is d 2 i , where d = tb with t > 1 and keeping all the other features of our model intact, we recon…rm that the …rms' optimal mix of advertising favors comparative instead of non-comparative as long as t is su¢ ciently small (t < 2+ 2 ). We also con…rm that our main results do not qualitatively change when comparative is more expensive than non-comparative advertising.
Concluding remarks
We analyzed …rms' advertising strategies in a duopolistic market in which …rms can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. We also studied the market and societal implications of the presence of both types of advertising in the market in comparison with markets in which one or both types of advertising are absent due, e.g., to legal restraints.
We found that in equilibrium, …rms spend on both non-comparative and comparative advertising. A central contribution of our analysis is that …rms' advertising warfare intensi…es when …rms are able to launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns.
In particular, …rms spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising. Most importantly, the higher the competitive pressure (as measured by either the degree of product substitutability or the mode of market competition), the more biased towards comparative advertising are the expenditures of the …rms. This …nding highlights that a more competitive market environment makes the aggressive comparative advertising strategy more attractive than the traditional self-promoting non-comparative one.
Regarding the welfare implications, we demonstrated that …rms'mixture over advertising strategies always bene…ts consumers, i.e., consumers'surplus takes its highest value when …rms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. In addition, a mixed advertising market often leads to higher welfare than markets in which one or both types of advertising are not present. More speci…cally, it leads to higher welfare than a market in which …rms can launch only non-comparative advertising campaigns, i.e., in markets in which comparative advertising is either banned or mistrusted by consumers, as long as products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated and consumers are highly concerned over the products'quality.
Although the use of comparative advertising is detrimental to the …rms'pro…tability (i.e., …rms' pro…ts are lower in the presence than in the absence of comparative advertising), …rms'spending on comparative advertising campaigns can improve not only the consumers'surplus but also the social welfare as long as they are launched together with non-comparative advertisements. An important policy implication of our analysis is that the regulator should not ban comparative advertising, especially when its objective is maximize consumers'surplus.
Our analysis leads to a number of testable implications. First, we should observe that …rms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns in horizontally di¤erentiated industries with few …rms endowed with similar production technologies. Second, if the risk of being prosecuted to the courts by the rivals and to be accused for misleading advertising is rather small, we expect …rms to spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising. Finally, we should observe dissimilar reaction patterns of advertising expenses to an increase in the industry competitive pressure. In particular, in highly competitive markets, i.e., markets with a high degree of product substitutability, we should observe a positive relationship between competitive pressure and advertising expenses.
Whereas the opposite is expected to occur in markets with low competitive pressure.
In contrast to common wisdom, we found that comparative advertising campaigns are used even when …rms' products are complementary, although with relatively lower intensity compared to non-comparative advertising. This is due to the dual, pull-me-push-you, role of comparative advertising, i.e., it is used by each …rm to promote, along with non-comparative advertising, its product quality to consumers. Of course, in this case a di¤erent type of advertising, e.g., an individual …rm's advertising campaign over the bundle of the products, seems to be more appropriate. Whether …rms still use comparative advertising in the presence of the latter type of advertising is left for future research.
Appendix A.1
We present here how we derive …rm i's expected inverse demand function. First, as described in Section 2, we distinguish sixteen groups of consumers, n = 1; 2; :::; 16, based on the messages that a consumer receives from the two advertising …rms. The share of each group in the market, n ; is given by the respective probability with which a consumer receives messages from the …rms. Thus, the expected inverse demand function of …rm i is the weighted (by their respective probabilities) sum of the inverse demand functions of these sixteen groups of consumers. In the following we present the share of each group of consumers in the market (stated in the column, n ) and its respective inverse demand function (stated in the column,
We present here how we derive the consumers surplus and the social welfare under mix advertising. In equilibrium, we have:
Hence the inverse demand function (2) can be rewritten as:
Let i and j be an individual consumer's perceived quality for …rm i's and …rm j's products, respectively. Her consumer surplus cs(x i ; x j ; i ; j ) is given by
where x i and x j denote the quantity of the product i and j that this consumer buys, respectively. As the …rms'prices are equal in equilibrium, the …rst order conditions of the individual 21 consumer's utility maximization can be written as:
Solving the latter system of equations, and using the expression obtained above for q M , we have
Further, using the …rst order conditions above, the individual consumer's surplus can be written as:
. Hence, we can summarize the sixteen types of consumers into six groups with ( i ; j ) being respectively, (0; 0), (1; 0), (1; 1), (2; 1), (2; 0) and (1; 1), where the …rst element corresponds to any of the two products that is perceived (weakly) better than the other. It follows that consumers' surplus is the sum of the surplus of these groups weighted by their respective probabilities of appearance in the market:
After some manipulations, consumers surplus is given by
where (:) = 6(1 + s n ) + 2 (4 + 3s n ) + 2 (5 + 2s n ) + 3 : Social welfare is then,
Non-advertising. This is the standard Cournot market with horizontally di¤erentiated goods. Solving each …rm's maximization problem, given in (3) after setting i = 0 and i = 0;
we obtain the equilibrium output and pro…ts
Further, the consumers surplus and the total welfare are
Mere Non-Comparative Advertising. We present here the analysis of a market in which …rms have available only non-comparative advertising. Solving each …rm's maximization problem, given in (3) after setting i = 0, we obtain the equilibrium advertising intensity, output and pro…ts
Further, the consumers surplus 25 and the total welfare are
Mere Comparative Advertising. We present here the analysis of a market in which …rms have available only comparative advertising. Solving each …rm's maximization problem, given in (3) after setting i = 0, we obtain the equilibrium advertising intensity, output and
Further, the consumers'surplus 26 and total welfare are
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1:
We di¤erentiate M and M with respect to b n , s n and and we have:
2 < 0 and CS M CS C , we …nd that they are always positive. Second, taking the di¤erences CS I CS N and CS C CS N we observe that they are always positive.
ii) First, taking the following di¤erences, SW M SW C , we …nd that it is always positive.
Second, taking the di¤erence SW M SW I , we observe that it is positive if and only if is small enough and s n >s n ( ; b n ). 27 Finally, taking the di¤erence SW M SW N , we observe that it is positive except if is large enough and s n is su¢ ciently close to zero.
Appendix C
We present here the equilibrium outcomes when …rms compete in prices.
Non-advertising. This is the standard Bertrand market with di¤erentiated products.
The equilibrium output, pro…ts, consumers'surplus and total welfare are Mere Comparative Advertising. In case where only comparative advertising is available in the market, the equilibrium advertising intensity, output and pro…ts, consumers' surplus and total welfare are 
